Best papers?

Over at Thoughts, Arguments and Rants, Brian Weatherson suggests that some blog take up the slack left by the (apparent) death of the Philosopher's Annual. I don't think this is the right place to take up the task in its entirety. But I'm a big fan of distributed cognition: we can take on the part where we have expertise. So I hereby call for nominations: what are the best papers in philosophy of action, moral responsibility and free will, published since 2003 (the last year for which PA produced a volume)?

Comments

[Kevin]

People may also want to consider the debate over the desirability and feasibility of this kind of enterprise at Certain Doubts here: http://fleetwood.baylor.edu/certain_doubts/?p=644

This isn't to nix the idea; but the conversation there raises a number of good methodological worries.

[Kip Werking]

Kane's handbook, including Galen Strawson's last article on free will (which I love), seems to miss the 2003 deadline by a year.

The only paper I think *has* to be on this list is Nichols & Knobe's affect/compatibilism finding.

I would want to include something from Smilansky. "Compatibilism: The Argument From Shallowness" or "Egalitarianism, Free Will, and Ultimate Injustice" (which is unpublished).

I would also want to add something from the prolific Al Mele (who just updated his CV yesterday!). I like his Zygote Argument, so I would add his article from the GFP Reading Group, "Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility", which also seems to be otherwise unpublished. A paper which presents a similar argument is "For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything" by Greene and Cohen. Greene has also done amazing work on moral realism and deontology/consequentialism, which is in the spirit of Nichols & Knobe's finding.

There have been two *great* articles about free will in the law reviews, which argue for views similar to my own: Slobogin's "The Civilization of the Criminal Law" and Kirchmeier's "A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and the Progression Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice".

All of these articles, of course, betray my own biases. But I am tempted to add one paper even though I strongly disagree with it. Although I think this article reaches the wrong answers, I think it asks the right questions, and although it makes mistakes (or so I argue), those mistakes are instructive. That paper is Fischer's The Cards That Are Dealt You.