Surveying the Sounds of Freedom

Well, now Kip’s gone and done it!  In his attempt to make my free-will-comes-in-degrees view sound silly (well, counterintuitive at least), he’s used the folk against me, claiming that “the average Joe on the street” would think it sounded awkward to ask, “How much free will do you have?”

I agree that question sounds awkward, certainly more awkward than the question, “Do you have free will?” (which sounds a bit strange too, I suppose).  I’d say it’s because the question is phrased wrong or perhaps needs to be asked in context.  (“How much intelligence do you have?” sounds a little funny too.)  But maybe it's because the folk think free will doesn't come in degrees.

But what about these questions—do they sound awkward?

--Do adults have more free will than children?

--Does God have more free will than we do?

--Do we have more free will than dogs have?

--Do children attain more free will as they get older?

--Can you lose some of your free will if you get certain mental disorders?  For instance, does a person with schizophrenia have less free will than a normal adult?

--Do you have less free will if you are overcome by emotion?

--Could an incredibly complex robot (like Data on Star Trek) have any free will?

--Do intelligent animals, like chimpanzees, have at least some free will?

--If you have more free will, are you more responsible for your actions?

--Do people become more responsible for their actions as they get older and have more free will?

What if we replace the “free will” talk with “act freely” talk? E.g., Do children act more freely as they get older?

What if we replace it with “up to” talk (the phrase that, in our surveys, seems to track “free will” most closely)?  E.g., Are adults decisions more up to them than children’s?

What if we replace it with “morally responsible” talk?

I’m not sure.  I guess I’ll try running a study, using the techniques linguists use to test grammatically (also one of the methods Knobe and Prinz use to test intuitions about consciousness):  present people with sentences and ask them if they sound right or not (e.g., do they “sound natural” or “sound weird”).

I predict (from my armless armchair) that most folk would think most of the questions about free will sound OK (and would offer some interesting answers to them), though they may think the other formulations (e.g., act freely talk) sound more natural.  But it's a prediction that would require testing.

But, now for a survey of gardeners:

--Do you think the answers to such questions would have any bearing on the philosophical debates? 

--If so, what?  If it came out as I predict, would it help support the claim that free will can be understood as something we possess to varying degrees rather than all or none?

--If not, why not?  (Was van Inwagen right when he suggested that outside of philosophical discussions, no one uses the term “free will” except in expressions of the form “act of one’s own free will?)

--Do you have any predictions about what people would say about questions of the form above (or statements with similar form)?

--And most of all, do you have any statements you think would be helpful to test on the folk?

Comments

[John K. Alexander]

I am not a contributor to his blog although I do wonder on it occasionally. Although it does not pertain directly to Eddy's comment, I have a question pertaining to free-will and choice. If sociologists are correct, we know that if unemployment/poverty levels go up so do instances of unwanted social behavior, i.e., spousal/child abuse, drug/alcohol abuse, suicides, etc. We can develop a statistical basis for understanding and predicting these increases re increasing levels of unemployment/ poverty. The question I have is, if we know statistically that instances of unwanted social behavior will increase if unemployment/poverty increases then are the individuals that make up these statistics free to choose to abuse the spouses and/or children, abuse alcohol/drugs, commit suicide, etc or are their actions the result of causal factors outside of their control?

There is an underlying (personal) moral issue that motivates this question. When I was in business, on a number of occasions I laid-off, terminated, and/or downsized people who worked for the organizations I managed. On one Friday, I downsized a company by @ 50% of its total number of employees. I had sound economic reasons for doing so. But, if I knew that by removing people from my organization, thereby increasing the levels of unemployment/poverty, that instances of unwanted social behavior would increase, am I responsible, both casually and morally, for the increases associated with the behavior of those people whose lives I adversely affected who perform such unwanted social behavior?

[Joe]

John,

According to Kip and anyone who denies that we have free will (and thus believes that no one is morally responsible for anything), the answer to your last question is 'No.' You are not responsible for anything because none of your choices -- including your choice to lay off your workers -- is ultimately up to you.

I think that compatibilists and libertarians would need to know more about the specifics of the situation before they could give an answer. Sorry I can't be of more help than this! And I'm sorry for your situation!

[Joe]

Eddy,

Being the average Joe on this blog at least here are my answers:

--Do you think the answers to such questions would have any bearing on the philosophical debates?

Yes. They might help us to understand that the folks' thoughts on free will are not as mixed up as some of us think that they are. Or they might help us to understand that the folks' thoughts are so mixed up that we shouldn't really care what they think.

--If so, what? If it came out as I predict, would it help support the claim that free will can be understood as something we possess to varying degrees rather than all or none?

Maybe. (I'll have more to say about this issue later.)

--If not, why not? (Was van Inwagen right when he suggested that outside of philosophical discussions, no one uses the term “free will” except in expressions of the form “act of one’s own free will?)

I tend to think that van Inwagen is right BUT clearly the folk use expressions like 'act freely' which get at more or less the same thing.

--Do you have any predictions about what people would say about questions of the form above (or statements with similar form)?

I think that the folk think that responsibility comes in degrees: adults are more responsible for their actions than are children, children are more responsible than dogs, dogs are more responsible than rocks. One problem is that we often move quickly from talk about responsibility to talk about freedom and choice. It might be hard to separate whether the folk think that there are mitigating factors when it comes to attributions of moral responsibility or that freedom comes in degrees.

--And most of all, do you have any statements you think would be helpful to test on the folk?

One view of free will that does not admit of degrees is the agency theory. It would be interesting to craft some questions that might determine whether the folk see agency as essential to free will. I'm not sure how to do that.

[Eddy Nahmias]

Joe, by agency theory do you mean agent causation? If so, couldn't they still say free will comes in degrees because, even though you either have agent causal powers or you don't, there are other necessary conditions for acting of your own free will (e.g., compatibilist-style conditions) that the agent may exercise to varying degrees in different cases?

I should mention that after posting, I realized that one explanation for a person's saying that this question sounds natural, "Do humans have more free will than animals?" is that they think we have FW and animals have none, so we have more. It would be helpful to tease out these considerations by looking at patterns of answers. For instance, if someone says that at least some animals have at least some free will, then it seems their answer that we have more than these animals would indicate some agreement with the idea that free will comes in degrees, no?

[Joe]

Yes and no. See my 'new' account of free will in Cognitive Biases and Free Will Part 3: Oodles of Biases.

[John K. Alexander]

Joe: Thanks for your comments. I appreciate your concern for my situation (although I am no longer having to make these types of decisions; I am now in academia). Interestingly, to me anyway, is that I would not change my decisions even if I were morally responsible for the increase in unwanted social behavior. To me. it is the price of having to choose between outcomes that are each harmful to some extent. I am reminded of Sartre's claim in "Dirty Hands" that one cannot govern (manage) without being elbow deep in the blood of innocent people (and we all know what he thought about freedom.)

Now to a comment directly related to Eddy's post. I am concerned with the philosophical relevence of folk intuitions and the overall epistemic status of intuitions in general. I find it very interesting that people have studied how people respond to certain thought experiments and questions (I have done so myself), but I am left a bit confused as to what this proves other then percentages of people have certain intuitions.

Let us stipulate for the sake of argument that 60% respond 'yes' to the first question posed by Eddy and 40% respond 'no.' What does this demonstrate other then 60% said yes and 40% said no? If my intuition is 'no' then does it follow that the 60% are wrong, or is my intuition wrong? In fact, can intuitions be right or wrong? What does it mean to say that an intuition is right or wrong? Are intuitions simply basic data that exist without any epistemic value whatsoever other then a starting point for discussion and argumentation that moves us beyond the intuition to something that does have epistemic value independent of the initial intuition?

I know that certain thought experiments are designed to elicit certain intuitions and that these intuitions are then used as data to support positions that seem to be consistent with a person holding that intuition. Singer's argument on aiding the poor is an example. But having an intuition is not the same as being warranted in believing that the intuition is true or warranted or that if has any epistemic status in determining the truth of other situations. We seem to be stuck in the world of 'if-then.' If we ought to do x because we have intuition y, how do we eliminate the 'if.'

I know these are a lot of questions and I do not have very good answers to them. The only suggestion that I have is that we agree to accept certain intuitions that result from well defined thought experiments, designed to elicit that intuition, as warranted/true and move on from there. This is the move that Socrates makes with Crito when he asks if he (Crito) still agrees that we ought not to do wrong, etc.

[Tamler Sommers]

For what it's worth, I disagree with Kip that I seem to be more familiar with an all-or-nothing or soul-like concept of free will. On the contrary, I'd predict that people do lean more towards a matter-of-degree notion of free will and especially of moral responsibility. It seems very natural to think that a violent criminal with a horrific abusive upbringing is less morally responsible than a criminal coming from a privileged background. But people tend not to absolve the abused criminal from ALL responsibility.

That said, of course, I think people are wrong to look at moral responsibility this way. The 'matter-of-degree' perspective comes, I believe, from not sufficiently thinking through why we partially exonerate the behavior of the abused criminal. (And from being confused metaphysically.)

[Alan]

This is a very interesting discussion, but also a difficult one because it involves so many features of the free will problem on both the metaphysical and responsibility sides of the coin.

Let's flip to the responsibility side. There's no doubt that the folk grade responsibility in degrees, largely due to the fact that they know something about the criminal justice system, either from direct involvement in it or from "Law and Order". Degrees of crimes and thus responsibility for them are indexed to degrees of intent, ranging from premeditative planning (first degree) to impromptu intent (second or less) to negligence (not possessing proper intent). If responsibility does qualitatively index to certain properties of intent, then it seems that those properties don't necessarily involve varying degrees of freedom (though perhaps depending on what freedom of choice means). Why? Posit LFW. That same form of FW could underlie both first and second degree choices to commit crimes. The difference between them would be content of intent relative to time--not the fact of indeterministic choice based on particular content at a particular time. (This assumes a ceteris paribus of the context of both choices--namely, that similar LFW choosers in the first degree context might choose either way, and that the same would apply to similar choosers in the second degree case. And I think no defender of LFW could argue otherwise.) So at least for some concepts of free will (LFW), a degree of responsibility is logically independent of the fact of choice, though of course that latter fact could be an independent necessary condition of responsibility, and even as all-or-nothing. (The (in-)famous and influential Model Code essentially recognizes these same conditions. Its conjunctive test for the presence of mens rea in the responsibility-phase of trials are (1)rational intent, and (2) the ability to choose the right (much as Wolf said). Compatibilists and incompatibilists alike could accept these, though on quite distinct metaphysical grounds.)

Now flip to the metaphysical side of freedom. Aside from common-usage arbitration of terminology, there is little to constrain argument. Thus the appeal of X-philosophy, I'd say. But I'd argue that such linguistic/intuitive approaches treat the problem of free will too narrowly. Freedom, if it exists anywhere, exists in the public sphere. If anything is free at all, it is physically animate beings--beings with the power of movement and thus beings of potential physical freedom. I say potential because freedom here is a function of two factors: ability and opportunity (I have said elsewhere opportunitX--putting aside PAP-style issues for that factor.) If physical freedom is an example par excellance of freedom in general (and I hope including mental freedom), then obviously freedom always metaphyscially admits of degrees. That's because both ability and opportunities (now explicitly plural) always admit of gradations of more or less (assuming an ontology or domain greater than 1 thing). Superman is physically freer than any human in terms of ability, as Shaq is (now) freer than I am with respect to dunking the ball. But the placement of ability with respect to opportunity is crucial. Kryptonians can leap tall building in a single bound--if there are buildings to provide the opportunity to do so. Shaq can (now) dunk the ball--if there are hoops to do so. No place to develop this here, but I think internal (probably dispositional) abilities relate to external (actual) possibilities to produce the (modal?) relationship of freedom. And as that relationship can vary physically with respect to do X both in terms of ability and opportunities, the associated claim will as a result be one of more or less a physical freedom to do X. That said, I'd also note that related to some claim of freedom to do X physically, there is always a minimal threshold of accomplishment. With respect to the claim that one can freely communicate one's ideas, I'd say that ML King in 1964 was quite free to do so: he was gifted mentally; the Nobel opened as well many avenues of opportunity to communicate. But Stephen Hawking today just barely crosses that same kind of threshold. His opportunities to be heard are at least as great as King's. But he can do so only if he can still move his hand to activate his computer-voice (or, if that fails, move his eyes to operate an optic interface to his computer). Hawking is only a few nerve circuits away from losing that freedom, even if his brain remains entirely active and fertile. I'd thus say from this threshold perspective, as far as physical freedom to do X is concerned, there must be a minimal ability and at least one opportunity for one to be free to do X.

Now just one more point, following Pettit in his Theory of Freedom, but amplified to a metaphysical level. Freedom in all arenas of human experience are related and, if they exist at all, admit of graduations based on degrees of ability and opportunities, though probably minimally instantiated at some threshold level in order to exist at all. If free will is part of this freedom continuum (of physical, social, political freedom, for example, but all more "outward" from a hypothetical mental freedom), then it likely shares these properties. At least I think so.

[Joe]

Tamler,

The 'matter-of-degree' view of free will/moral responsibility might be wrong for one of two reasons. Peter Unger's example of 'flatness' is helpful here (Philosophical Relativity).

One might say that a particular table is absolutely flat. In response, a flatness denier might say "Nothing is absolutely flat; absolute flatness is impossible!"

Alternatively, one might deny that a table is flat in some particular context. We might be playing pool -- at the Garden Lounge in Moscow, perhaps. You ask me, "Is the pool table flat" and I answer "Yes." Upon inspection you say "That table is not flat!" What you mean is that it is not flat enough for the purposes of playing pool -- given your high standards, at least.

Similarly, a free will denier might think that free will has an absolute character, and given this absolute standard no one is ever free. Or he might think that moral responsibility requires a certain level of freedom and that we never actually achieve that level (though other possible beings might be able to achieve it).

Which one best describes your view? I think that G. Strawson adopts the first type of free will denialism whereas Pereboom adopts the second kind.

Let me add that I like Alan's comments above, as well. They might help to provide criticisms of either of the views I've noted here.

[Tamler Sommers]

Joe,

Thanks for the question. Here's my best shot. I think moral responsibility for our actions comes from being ultimately responsible for (or the 'ultimate source of') certain aspects of the way we are. Now of course no one thinks that we are ultimately responsible for the way we are in every respect. (We aren't responsible for the size of our noses, the color of our eyes etc.) But we do tend to think that we are ultimately responsible for some aspects of our character (which I'll use as shorthand for 'the way we are.')

Now, crucially, we also think that the number of determining factors leading to actions and making up our characters FOR WHICH we are ultimately responsible differs from person to person. (Sorry for the clumsy formulation but I think it makes sense.) The more determining factors we are ultimately responsible for, the greater the moral responsibility we have for our actions. This is how moral responsibility can be seen as a matter-of-degree concept.

This account accords nicely, I think, with our natural unwillingness to blame criminals with horrific upbringings as much as criminals who seemingly had all the advantages life could offer. In the latter case, we think that they are ultimately responsible for more of the determining factors of their characters and the actions that stem from them.

To give another example: Take two point guards. One has amazing natural ability but is rarely seen working on his game. The other is slower, clumsier, but works out fanatically, and stays after practice shooting free throws and doing dribbling drills. Now, imagine they are considered equals on the court--both midrange first round draft picks--it's very hard to know who to take. I think people would consider the second guy more responsible, more praiseworthy, for his ability than the first guy. Why? Because he is thought to be the ultimately responsible for more of the determining factors of that ability. Natural talent is thought to a matter of luck, something we're not responsible for possessing. Hard work and self-discipline, on the other hand, is attributed to us.

Now skeptics (sorry, denialists) can agree with this account of moral responsibility, but still maintain their position by asserting that we are not ultimately responsible for any aspect of our character whatsoever.
Where people go wrong is in thinking that we can be ultimately responsible for certain aspects of our character (like self-disciple) and not others (like appearance or talent). This is natural, but mistaken. The amount of self-disciple we have, along with our opportunity to employ it, is ultimately just as much a matter of luck as our appearance. (Galen Strawson makes this point often.)

I don't think there is any "metaphysical megalomania" in this account. No one is saying that we have to ultimately responsible for ALL aspects of our character in order to be morally responsible for our actions. We just have to ultimately responsible for AT LEAST ONE relevant determining factor of our action or the character that performed it. But we aren't.

Is this more like Pereboom or more like Strawson, I'm not sure. I do think Strawson is treated unfairly due to some confusion over the 'causa sui' concept. (It is too easily caricatured as meaning something like wholly responsible for every aspect of our character, which Strawson surely doesn't take 'causa sui' to mean. I read him as taking a view much more similar to the one I sketched out above.)

[Kip Werking]

I find it amusing that my comments seem to provoke compatibilists into posting responses as entire new threads, and not just additional comments (e.g. this thread, the Intuitions thread).

Let me first say that I apologize for mischaracterizing Tamler's view (I'm not 100% sure that I did, but he's the better judge). What he says makes a lot of sense to me, and I wonder how much, at bottom, we disagree. Tamler says that, in practice, the folk refer to moral responsibility and free will as admitting of degrees, but that they are confused. I agree with all of this. If the folk thought through their confusions, and realized (as Tamler and I agree, or at least I think we agree!) that free will does not exist, then their concept might, at bottom, be all or nothing. But I shouldn't be so quick to put words in others' mouths.

As for Eddy: I may have different inclinations about whether free will is all-or-nothing, but I can wholeheartedly endorse your interest in collecting some evidence! Earlier, when I suggested that we collect evidence about how the folk use these terms (in, e.g., the Intuitions thread), and that some people might need to change their views in light of this evidence, I felt as if I met some strong resistance.

Indeed, as I settle into my semantic ambiguity + cognitive biases view, as explanation for why this problem never dies, I can agree that actually determining what these terms mean, and acquiring evidence, is probably the only way to make progress.

That said, when we do collect such evidence, I doubt that we are going to find perfectly formed and consistent concepts. Consider a square. I bet if you performed the sorts of studies you mentioned, and asked people how many corners a square has (4), whether a square is necessarily blue or red (it's not), and so on, you would find virtually 100% consensus about what a square is. We can call this measure of variation X. I strongly suspect, when somebody finally does detailed studies about how people use "free will" and "moral responsibility", that X will be huge, much larger than that of "square"---to the point of jeopardizing whether "free will" has any coherent, consistent meaning at all. Double made this point a long time ago, and people didn't really embrace that possibility, but the danger didn't go away. We're still going to have to confront just how vague and ambiguous these terms are.

Nevertheless, as Hilary Bok rightly noted, even concepts that are fuzzy around the edges can still have essential attributes. I can say, whatever free will is, it is incompatible with life story design (as described in the Zygote Argument). Indeed, I suspect that is how people started using the term "free will", just in reference to the Free Will Defense, against the Argument from Evil (the Greeks discussed similar problems, but did they say "free will" or its Greek equivalent?). I could be wrong about this; it would be fascinating to study the term's history (another empirical inquiry that will help make progress here). But if I am right about this, then one essential attribute of free will, and one motivation for its existence within our language, is to protect us from something that compatibilists now say it is compatible with (life story design). Am I right about this? I don't know, let's do the empirical research and find out.

To answer your question: all of the questions you ask sound awkward to my ear. Each can be converted to an all-or-nothing version, which sounds much less awkard. And this strikes me as strong prima facie evidence that free will does not admit of degrees.

Now, given my emphasis on the semantic ambiguity here, I'm willing to acknowledge that it may not sound awkard to your ear. In other words, unlike the term "square", we may just have genuinely, fundamentally different understandings of what free will is.

Suppose we do have such different understanding. Now, I realize people take issue with relying too much on common usage, but I still feel it is important to ask who is using the term in an idiosyncratic way? Is my usage idiosyncratic? Or is yours? Or is the term so ill defined that both, or neither, is properly considered idiosyncratic? And one of the best ways to answer this question, if not the only one, is to actually go out and collect evidence and determine how people use the term. So, I am very happy to hear you endorsing that sort of work.

Note that the alleged popularity of incompatibilist intuitions (as referenced in many offhand remarks and in compatibilist papers trying to question this assumption) provides me some comfort and confidence, as we are exposed to this empirical fire. But it is also important to note that the results have been, so far, mixed at best, with compatibilists able to rebut, empirically, many of the incompatibilists claims or assumptions (e.g. your own results versus those of Nichols and Knobe). So, when I suggest that we go out into the world and collect data, I do not at all think I am guaranteed of success.

And it may be that, for any compatibilist data you guys collect, incompatibilists can go back and find some incompatibilist data (what would the folk say about the Zygote Argument; or better yet, what would they say about each of its premises in isolation?). And it may be too much to expect a final answer to the question. But at least we are playing the empirical game then, and have evidence to back up our conceptual analysis, instead of playing in the empirical dark.

[Joe]

Tamler,

Thanks for your response to my question!

I like the basketball player analogy but I’m not sure that I agree with your assessment of it. You write: “I think people would consider the second guy more responsible, more praiseworthy, for his ability than the first guy. Why? Because he is thought to be the ultimately responsible for more of the determining factors of that ability.”

But why not just say that we think that the second guy is more responsible for the determining factors of his ability than the second guy? More of those factors were a result of what he did as opposed to what was given to him. Why does ULTIMATE responsibility enter into the picture at all?

I’ve used a similar example before but no one has responded to it yet: Two men rob a bank. Thus, no one is ultimately responsible for the bank robbery. That -- in and of itself -- can’t be a reason for holding no one responsible. Both seem to be partly responsible for the bank robbery and both are partly to blame.

How do you respond to this example? It seems to suggest that ultimate responsibility is not necessary for blameworthiness.

[Tamler Sommers]

Joe,

I think you're confusing 'ultimately responsible' with 'wholly responsible.' We think the bankrobbers are blameworthy because they are ultimately responsible for some portion of their characters that led them to play a role in robbing the bank. For them to blameworthy, not only do they not have to be wholly responsible for robbing the bank, they do not have to wholly responsible for their role in robbing the bank. But they do have to be ultimately responsible for at least one determining factor that led to the bank robbery. (And as I say, the more determining factors we think they are ultimately responsible for, the more blameworthy we will hold them.) Does that make sense?

[Joe]

Tamler,

Well, I might be confused -- but not about the difference between being 'ultimately responsible' and being 'wholly responsible.'

Here is another way to make the point. We accept that each of the robbers in my example is responsible even if neither is ultimately responsible for the robbery. (They are not wholly responsible either but as you say that is a different issue.) What I mean by this is that the causal chain leading to the bank robbery does not begin with either of the robbers. As you trace it backwards it branches off, one branch leading to one robber and another branch leading to another.

Thus, on some occassions we accept that someone might be responsible for something (in this case an event, e.g., the bank robbery) even if they are not ultimately responsible for it. So why is the situation different with regard to our characters? Why can't I be responsible for my character (and thus the actions that flow from it) even if I am not ultimately responsible for any part of it? Certainly the things that I do play some role in the formation of my character. I am at least partly responsible for it -- more responsible than anyone else. That should count for something.

Thanks!

[Tamler Sommers]

Now I'm confused. We're not holding each bank robber responsible for the whole bank robbery. We're holding them responsible for their role in the bank robbery. And we do think that some potion of the causal chain leading to the role each robber plays begins with each of the robbers (assuming we hold them responsible).

Again, it may be that we blame the robbers for only a tiny part of each role. But in order for us to think they deserve any blame at all we have to think that they were ultimately responsible for at least some portion of the events leading to their role in robbing the bank or that they were ultimately responsible for some portion of the events leading up to their intention to play a role in the bank robbery. (The disjunction is there just to ward off some Frankfurt-style objections...)

Responding to your last claim:

"Certainly the things that I do play some role in the formation of my character. I am at least partly responsible for it -- more responsible than anyone else. That should count for something."

I'd say 'no, it shouldn't.' In order to be even partly responsible for the role that you play in forming your character, you would have to make at least one decision that doesn't trace back to something you're not responsible for. (To be clear, I mean responsible in the desert-entailing sense.) If that condition isn't met, then the way you decide to form your character is a matter of luck like everything else, and you're not more responsible than anyone else (in the desert entailing sense). Although you're not less responsible either.

I realize that will sound question-begging to a compatibilist, but of course your claim sounds question-begging to me..

[Mark Smeltzer]

Tamler,

According to my understanding of your view of "ultimate responsibility", I can't help but read the above paragraph something like the following:Again, it may be that we blame the robbers for only a tiny part of each role. But in order for us to think they deserve any blame at all we have to think that they were [squarly circle] for at least some portion of the events leading to their role in robbing the bank or that they were [squarly circle] for some portion of the events leading up to their intention to play a role in the bank robbery. In the context of your view, I have no more sense of how to interpret the predicate "squarly circle" than I do the predicate "ultimately responsible". If I were routinely using such predicates, I would be at least a little bothered by the fact that I was speaking nonsense... Then again, maybe it seems similarly awkward to you that others seem to think they are making some sense when they talk about desert entailing responsibility...

Realists about desert entailing responsibility are going to assert that we're talking about different things, and that the logically impossible concept you have in mind is irrelevant. So, the burden of proof lies on you to convince us that we are in fact working with the same concept. Would you agree this assessment?

[Eddy Nahmias]

At some point it'd be nice for Gardeners to discuss John Searle's "mysterious gap" view of free will (which I find, how shall I put it, problematic). Anyway, for now, it is relevant to this post that he has written a short summary of his view at the New Scientist, with a header that states:
"For years, the frustrating lack of progress on the problem of free will has been a scandal in philosophy."

If that's a scandal, then what should we say about the fact that we can't even agree about what progress would look like!

You need a subscription for the full article but can read the first paragraph here:
http://www.newscientist.com/channel/being-human/mg19325861.700-tackling-the-problem-of-free-will.html

[Jonathan]

Eddy, I'm a psych undergrad...want me to run the experiment? :D

[Tamler Sommers]

Mark, I'm sensitive that problem, it is a tough one, but no--I don't think I have the burden to convince you that YOU and I are working with the same concept. In fact, I'm sure we're not. I believe you when you tell me that your concept of DEMR doesn't involve ultimate responsibility. My burden is to show that my concept of DEMR is more intuitively plausible than yours (while at the same time fending off attacks from those pesky revisionists). And I agree that it's a tough burden because it would be sort of weird, as you and Hurley and other have pointed out, to have logically impossible conditions for moral responsibility. Nevertheless, think that most people do have that concept--they see ultimate responsibility for at least some aspects the way we are as a necessary condition for blameworthiness and praiseworthiness (not knowing of course that this is logically or metaphysically impossible). But that's an empirical claim...

[Joe]

Tamler,

Think of two people -- A and B -- who conspire to murder a third person -- C. Each plays an equal role in the murder of C. If caught, we wouldn’t sentence A and B to half of a life-in-prison, would we? Certainly, we hold them responsible for their roles. But the fact is that if they had played the same role, yet the murder did not occur, we would not hold them responsible for murder. They at least seem to be responsible an event or state of affairs -- the murder of C. (Or maybe it is the proposition that C is murdered.) Since neither of them is solely responsible for the murder, neither of them is ultimately responsible for the murder. I don’t see how to get around that.

You claim you are not requiring that they be ultimately responsible for the murder and write: "In order to be even partly responsible for the role that you play in forming your character, you would have to make at least one decision that doesn't trace back to something you're not responsible for.”

This would generalize in to something like this principle: In order for S to be even partly responsible for X, X must be based on at least one decision that doesn’t trace back to something that S is not responsible for.

Here is another example. Suppose that B tells A that his wife is cheating on him and having an affair with C. A decides to murder C on the basis of this information. It seems that A is at least partly responsible for killing C. Yet A’s decision to kill C is based on some information obtained from B, and he is not responsible for that. His decision is clearly based on a number of things for which he is not responsible.

No doubt I might still be confused but I am at least trying to understand. As I see it, the principles supporting the argument for free will denialism -- or free will skepticism if you prefer -- are too restrictive. They seem to rule out moral responsibility in even the most simple of cases. I don’t see how they could serve as the basis for our common sense judgments about moral responsibility.

Anyway, thanks for your patience!

[Tamler Sommers]

Joe,

You say that you're not conflating 'ultimately responsible' with 'wholly responsible' but remarks like this make me wonder:

"Yet A’s decision to kill C is based on some information obtained from B, and he is not responsible for that. His decision is clearly based on a number of things for which he is not responsible."

Right, of course it is. But as I've said from the beginning, to be blameworthy for an act or decision you don't have to be responsible for everything that led to it. You just have to be ultimately responsible for at least one of the determining factors leading to the decision. Of course we can't we responsible for all of the factors that lead us to commit wrongdoing, or to decide to commit wrongdoing. But nobody, including G. Strawson, has ever placed that condition on moral responsibility.

(OK, I reread your post, now I see the issue. When discussing responsibility for character--not action--I said we'd have to make at least one decision that didn't trace back to something we weren't responsible for. But we don't even need to be wholly responsible for that one decision. Just partly responsible, i.e. ultimately responsible for at least one of the factors that led to that decision... And the same is true for decisions to act. It's really not that restrictive a principle, even if it is logically impossible.)

Regarding your first example, I'd say our decision not to give each of them half a life in prison is not related to issues of blameworthiness but more on legal issues (and also our belief that even playing a role in a murder should be punished by life imprisonment). And while neither of them can be ultimately or solely responsible for the entire murder, we might believe that both are ultimately responsible for playing necessary roles in the murder (i.e. that murder could not have occurred without each criminal playing his role). And that might certainly be enough to condemn them for life.

Finally, it's probably true that if they played the same role but somehow the murder did not occur, we won't hold them as responsible. But that's a familiar moral luck problem, one that most compatibilist theories are no better off accounting for.

[John K. Alexander]

This harkens back to the original list of questions asked by Eddy.

Why do we assume that there is only one type of will that human beings can have? Why can there not be human beings with different kinds of wills; ranging from stricly determined to libertarian, just like we have human beings with different other characteristics?

["Q" the Enchanter]

For what it's worth (if I may speak on behalf of lay persons), the notion of varying degrees of freedom of the will seems quite natural to us.

Also, we don't like being referred to as "the folk." It's condescending.

[Eddy Nahmias]

Thanks for the folk (strike that) *true* intuitional support. Actually, as someone who uses the term “folk” a lot, and has always felt uncomfortable doing so because it does sound a bit condescending, I wonder what “technical” concept we could replace it with. I sometimes refer to “ordinary [or commonsense] intuitions” or “people’s intuitions” or “laypersons’ intuitions” or “pre-philosophical intuitions,” but the first two are not precise enough to highlight that I am talking about non-philosophers, and the last two are a bit clumsy. Ideas?

[Tamler Sommers]

"Actually, as someone who uses the term “folk” a lot, and has always felt uncomfortable doing so because it does sound a bit condescending, I wonder what “technical” concept we could replace it with."

The lumpen?