Hello all,
I'm working on an update of my Stanford entry on moral responsibility. Since other entries (e.g., on compatibilism and incompatibilism) deal with those theories that attempt to spell-out the conditions on being responsible, my task has been to focus on the concept of responsibility itself. Below is a draft of some paragraphs on recent work in this area that I'm planning to add to the end of the entry. Using a distinction Gary Watson drew in his "Two Faces of Responsiblity," I've tried to map what I take to be an interesting trend, namely the increased attempt to articulate different aspects of the concept of responsiblity. As I note at the end, I think there's a connection between the drawing of these distinctions and the move toward revisionism discussed here in an earlier post.
I'd be happy for any feedback/corrections from this very able group. Some of the parenthetical citations are not yet complete. Thanks!
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Traditionally, most philosophers writing on moral responsibility have attempted to articulate an account of those conditions on responsible agency that mapped onto what was presumed to be a unitary and shared concept of moral responsibility. However, more recently a number of authors have suggested that at least some disagreements about the most plausible overall theory of responsibility might be based on a failure to distinguish between different aspects of the concept of responsibility, or perhaps several distinguishable but related concepts of responsibility.
Broadly speaking, a distinction has been drawn between responsibility understood as attributability and responsibility as accountability. (Terminology in marking this and similar distinctions varies. Here I adopt the terminology used in Watson 1996.) The central idea in judging whether an agent is responsible in the sense of attributabilty, say for an action, is whether the action discloses something about the nature of the agent's self (Watson 1996, p. 228). Some hold additionally that a judgment of responsibility in this sense includes an assessment of the agent's self as measured against some standard (though not necessarily a moral standard)-i.e., that our interest is in what the action discloses about the agent's evaluative commitments (Watson 1996, p. 235; Bok, p. 123, nt. 1. For reservations about whether responsibility in this sense entails an evaluative judgment, see Fischer and Ravizza,(?); Haji, p. 8; and Scanlon 1998, p. 248). Perhaps the clearest example of a conception of responsibility emphasizing attributability is the so-called "ledger view" of moral responsibility. According to such views, the practice of ascribing responsibility involves assigning a credit or debit to a metaphorical ledger associated with each agent (see Feinberg, pp. 30-1; Glover, p. 64; Zimmerman, pp. 38-9; and discussion of such views in Watson 1986, pp. 261-2; and Fischer and Ravizza 1998, pp. 8-10, nt. 12). To regard an agent as praiseworthy or blameworthy in the attributability sense of responsibility is simply to believe that the merit or fault identified properly belongs to the agent.
To be responsible for an action in the sense of being accountable (or "appraisable" according to the terminology of some) presupposes responsibility in the sense of attributability. However, to judge that an agent is responsible in the further sense of being accountable entails that the behavior properly attributed to the agent is governed by an interpersonal normative standard of conduct that creates expectations between members of a shared community (whereas the standard invoked above may or may not be thought to generate interpersonal expectations). In this way, the concept of moral responsibility as
accountability is an inherently social notion, and to hold someone responsible is to address a fellow member of the moral community (Stern, Watson 1987, McKenna). By emphasizing the way the reactive attitudes were tied to expectations of good will grounded in our interpersonal relationships, P. F. Strawson drew attention to this social aspect of responsibility. Recent attempts to further articulate how best to understand the relevant notion of holding responsible and its relation to being accountable reflect his on-going influence.
An agent is praiseworthy or blameworthy, in the sense of accountable, if one is warranted, or justified, in holding her responsible. On one popular view, holding someone responsible is interpreted as regarding him or her as an appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes and possibly other forms of reward or censure based on what the agent has done (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, pp. 6-7; Wallace, pp. 75-77; Watson 1996, p. 235; and Zimmerman, ch. 5). On another view, holding someone responsible is fundamentally a matter of making a moral judgment accompanied by an expectation that the agent who performed the act
acknowledge the force of the judgment or provide an exonerating explanation of why she performed the action. To hold someone responsible is thus to be one to whom an explanation is owed. On this view, the reactive attitudes and associated practices are derivative from this more fundamental expectation (Oshana, p. 76-7; Scanlon 1998, pp. 268-271). Since the reactive attitudes and associated practices may have consequences for the well-being of an agent (especially in the case of those blaming attitudes and practices involved in holding someone accountable for wrong-doing), they are justified only if it is fair that the agent be subject to those consequences (Wallace, pp. 103-117; and Watson 1996, pp. 238-9). The fairness of
being subject to those consequences has often,in turn, be interpreted as the source of the idea that praise and blame are justified only if they are merited (Wallace, pp. 106-7; Zimmerman, ch. 5. For the claim that the relevant notion of fairness need not be understood as desert, see Scanlon, pp. 283-7).
The recognition and articulation of diversity within the concept (or amongst concepts) of moral responsibility has generated new reflection on the nature of and prospects for theories attempting to spell-out the conditions on being morally responsible. While some continue to believe that a plausible unified theory can be offered that captures the conceptual diversity sketched above, a number of others have concluded that the conditions for the applicability of our folk concept is either metaphysically indefensible or morally suspect (Bok, ch. 1; Double 1996a, chs. 6-7; Honderich, 1988, vol. 2, ch. 1; Nagel, and G. Strawson 1986, 105-117, 307-317). For example, some have argued that while a compatibilist sense of freedom is
necessary for attributability, genuine accountability would require that agents be capable of exercising libertarian freedom (Honderich, 1988, vol. 2, ch. 1). Others have granted that while the folk concept of accountability may rest on a notion of fairness as desert, the relevant notion of desert is itself morally objectionable (Scanlon, p. 274; Kelly). Of course, there have always been those--e.g., hard determinists--who have concluded that the conditions on being responsible cannot be met and thus that no one is ever morally responsible. However, a noteworthy new trend amongst both contemporary hard determinists
and others who conclude that the conditions of our folk concept cannot be satisfied has been the move to offer a revisionist conception of moral responsibility rather than to reject talk about responsibility outright (For this general trend, see Vargas 2004 and forthcoming). Revisionism is a matter of degree. Some revisionists seek to salvage much if not most of what they take to be included in the folk concept (e.g., Honderich 1988, vol. 2, ch. 1; Scanlon, pp. 274-277; and Vargas 2004), while others offer more radical reconstructions (see Pereboom, Smart,and Smilansky).
