In June, Neil Levy posted to the Garden a draft chapter of Mark Balaguer's new book "Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem," MIT Press (December 2009).
I bought a copy of Mark's book and read it closely. It has a new introductory chapter, but chapters 2 through 4 are expanded, and in many places altered, versions of papers that Mark previously published in the Southern Journal of Philosophy, Noûs, and Synthese.
Gardeners had a chance to read and comment on chapter 2 - "Why the Compatibilism Issue and the Conceptual Analysis Issue Are Metaphysically Irrelevant." Balaguer maintained that the question whether free will exists - or of what kinds of free will exixt - was independent of the question of what free will is, i.e., whether it's Humean freedom, Frankfurtian freedom, or Libertarian freedom, for example.