Another scientist on free will

This time its Jerry Coyne, an evolutionary biologist of some renown, writing in USA Today.

Apparently he defines " free will"  in "the way most people think of it". As a good scientist, he consulted the  data on this question, right? Right? He wouldn't have relied on intuition; that's the kind of things philosophers do. 

Comments

[Eddy Nahmias]

My concern with Coyne's article is not only that he (as a scientist!) simply assumes that most people share his definition of "free will" as requiring dualism and "contra-causal powers," but worse that he moves very quickly from the claim that we don't have souls or such powers to the conclusions that we are puppets, our choices don't really matter, consciousness is an illusion and/or epiphenomenal, and there is no self. I suspect those claims are unlikely to advance his goal of making people more empathetic and less retributive. Tom Clark makes some of these points in comments at the USA Today article and at Coyne's blog here: http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2012/01/03/readers-comments-on-my-free-will-piece-and-my-responses/

For those interested, Coyne dismisses compatibilism here (failing to consider arguments that we can make choices even if determinism is true and confirming his definition of "free will" by "surveying" three scientists): http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/12/27/the-no-free-will-experiment/

Also, Coyne attacked my NYTimes piece at his blog here (in comment 62 I point out that his evidence that most people define 'free will' as he does is based on a rollback universe description of determinism that is very similar to the one I use to test whether most people are incompatibilists--they aren't): http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/11/15/another-philosopher-redefines-free-will-so-that-we-can-still-have-it/

Coyne's blog must be extremely popular, since each of these posts garners hundreds of comments.

[Neil]

Coyne's blog *is* very popular and arguably deservedly so. He is a very good evolutionary biologist, and has done excellent service in the public sphere in pointing out the fallacies and flaws of intelligent design arguments. Unfortunately, epistemic excellence often seems domain-limited in this kind of way, failing to generalize.

[Tom Clark]

Thanks Eddy. I've suggested to Coyne in my comments at his blog that he and Sam Harris (in his forthcoming booklet Free Will) should recant their puppethood conclusion. People really don't like to think of themselves as passive victims of circumstance, and it seriously undermines the prospects for acceptance of
naturalism to say that it makes us puppets, which of course it doesn't. Aargh!

[Neil]

Good luck Tom! I mean that: I think you are doing important work trying to get these people to use their public platform a little more wisely.

[Tamler Sommers]

Predictably, my biggest issue (though I agree with Eddy and Neil about theirs) is this line:

"Even without free will then, we can still use punishment to deter bad behavior, protect society from criminals, and figure out better ways to rehabilitate them. What is not justified is revenge or retribution — the idea of punishing criminals for making the "wrong choice." And we should continue to reward good behavior, for that changes brains in a way that promotes more good behavior."

Look, I used to believe that too and part of me maybe still does. But it's such a leap, from 'no contra-causal free will' to 'revenge is never justified.' Think of all the ethical premises that have to be true to make that inference. What makes those premises true? Some sort of mystical free floating ethical truths? Isn't Coyne supposed to be an uncompromising naturalist?

[Robert Kovsky]

I have a new and different view of these issues, set forth in an essay published at

http://www.quadnets.com/puzzle.html

Title and summary:

How to solve free-will puzzles and overcome limitations of platonic science

“Free will” puzzles are failed attempts to make freedom fit into forms of science. The failures seem puzzling because of widespread beliefs that forms of science describe and control everything. Errors in such beliefs are shown by analysis of forms of “platonic science” that were invented in ancient Greece and that have developed into modern physics. Static and quasi-static forms are suited for placid equilibrium conditions and relaxation processes. Linear forms, abstracted from geometrical space, impose rigidity and continuity. Such spatial forms fail to describe muscular movements of animals that have actual life. Limitations of platonic science are overcome by means of new forms with the character of time, e.g., forms of a beat and saccadic (jumpy) forms. New technologies of action and freedom generate and control temporal forms in proposed device models of brains. Some temporal forms have critical moments of transformation, e.g., a moment of overtaking during a footrace or a jury’s moment of decision during a trial in court.

Robert Kovsky

[Thomas Nadelhoffer]

Tamler,

It seems to me that see even more premises have to be true to make pro-desert/retribution arguments work than their anti-desert/retribution counterparts (especially if we don't allow ourselves to simply appeal to tradition). Moreover, I find it ever harder to understand how you or anyone else could show that the premises of the pro-desert/retribution arguments are true--e.g., punishing wrong doers is intrinsically valuable. But you and I have been around this block before. So, I won't hijack the thread. Just know you'll be welcomed back into the skeptical fold with open arms when you've recovered from your retributivist relapse!

[Neil]

It's been said that a liberal is a conservative who has been mugged. I suggest that a retributivist is a skeptic with children.

[Tamler Sommers]

"I suggest that a retributivist is a skeptic with children."

Neil, with your permission, that's the epigraph for my next paper or book.

Thomas,

My point is only that he's making a leap with premises that need defending. If I said 'there is (or isn't) free will, therefore revenge is justified,' the same would be true for me.

[John Fischer]

Coyne's recent fulminations on his blog on the Templeton Foundation Fellowship won by an outstanding young philosopher--a student of mine for whom I have the highest respect--indicated both a philosophical tone-deafness on Coyne's part and also just plain ignorance of the relevant philosophical issues. Whether his blog is in general "good" I don't know, and presumably he is a good scientist, but he does not know free will, and his attacks on the JTF Fellowship award winner's project were unwarranted, gratuitous, and frankly indicated a kind of intellectual narrowness and intolerance that is repugnant.

[Josh Shepherd]

Thanks for those links Eddy. Coyne gets upset about compatibilist 're-definition' of free will, but appears comfortable with a re-definition of (I guess what he assumes is the meaning of) moral responsibility.

A lot of the stuff Coyne says reads a bit like one side of the kind of political or religious back-and-forth you see on TV, facebook or at really bad parties. Seems free will represents for Coyne some anti-scientific notion popular with members of The Other Team. I get this sometimes in discussions with philosophers not at my University. The assumption is that interest in free will or related topics Must stem from some fear the Truth, which prevents one from Courageously embracing naturalism. Of course in my own mind I'm the Naturalism Secret Police, so having my credentials questioned is not amusing.

In my experience, such encounters become friendly if one switches to talk of the pre-Supplementary Motor Area, the function of the ventral stream, and so on. I realize this strategy might not be available for some. If this is you, I recommend reverse condescension. It slightly improves bad parties.

[John Fischer]

Josh,

But why bother? At some point one has better things to do with one's time. I do think it is important to "call out" people who are intellectually narrow and especially who attack young philosophers; why would a senior scientist at the University of Chicago do that, apart from being a bully? And the best tactic with a bully is not to talk nicely with them and try to get them to like you--cf. Barack Obama's disastrous attempts along these lines. What is regrettable however is giving ANY further attention to the fulminations on a blog written by someone who simply is ignorant of the relevant areas of philosophy. I reiterate: why bother?

Thomas:

You say to Tamler: "Moreover, I find it ever harder to understand how you or anyone else could show that the premises of the pro-desert/retribution arguments are true--e.g., punishing wrong doers is intrinsically valuable." But I thought that the retributivist's idea was not exactly that punishing wrong-doers is intrinsically valuable, but that the (proportionate) suffering of wrong-doers is intrinsically valuable. And, more importantly, it might be that the premise is true, even though one can't SHOW it to be true! I suppose that you could wonder how a utilitarian could ever PROVE or SHOW TO BE TRUE the principle of utility. And so forth. Wouldn't it be a bit much to expect that one could PROVE every premise of every argument? And what about the elements that go into the proof?

[John Fischer]

To clarify. When I asked, "Why bother?", I did not mean to suggest that Eddy's original post was not worthwhile, or that it is not in general worthwhile to engage scientists who discuss free will/moral responsibility. That was not my point. My point was specifically about Coyne's screeds about the JTF Fellowship.

And I realize Josh was just making a joke--although I must admit my head was spinning in trying to figure out "reverse condescension".

[John Fischer]

Argh. I seek to clean up after myself again. Obviously, I meant to say, "Neil's" original post, and Eddy's (and others') contributions.

Sorry.

Anyway, Happy New Year to all Fellow Flickerers.
John

[Al Mele]

Coyne writes: "Recent experiments involving brain scans show that when a subject "decides" to push a button on the left or right side of a computer, the choice can be predicted by brain activity at least seven seconds before the subject is consciously aware of having made it." I can't resist pointing out again that the accuracy rate of these predictions was about 60%. I can get a 50% accuracy rate with a fair coin, but I can do way better on time if participants agree to wait a minute or two before they press a button. At any rate, my guess is that what this early brain activity signifies is a slight bias toward a particular button on the next press. Hey, maybe that bias contributes to there being about a 60% chance that a participant will press button x next time! It's amazing how often the Soon et al. result is mentioned in recent "no free will" articles.

[V. Alan White]

Some of these pronouncements about statistical significance on FW studies reminds me of those of the wildly discredited Rhine Institute studies of paranormal phenomena formerly situated at Duke University. A little researcher bias and a lot of poor experimental design can go a long way.

[Daniel Leibmann]

Hi Im daniel leibmann, a student of the UNAM in mexico and is the first time I write a comment on Flickers of freedom, Although this page is one of my favorites and I am a regular visitor.

I have read the coyne article about "why i can´t have free will" and i found it not very interesting after all.....the same arguments about the "Determinist Universe" and the "fMRI prediction" (but like Mele says above the prediction is only 60% accuracy rate)

I think that the most important threat for the free will (even bigger than the "Determinist universe") is the control that we have over our actions (seen as related to neuroscience)

I read two articles that i found very interesting

In This article Ithzak Fried says that he can predict with 90% of accuracy the timing of a decision http://www.cell.com/neuron/retrieve/pii/S0896627310010822

In this other article Haynes says that he can predict if a person will add or subtract two numbers http://news.cnet.com/8301-11386_3-10131643-76.html

If this (or others) experiments show that the unconcious neural activity cannot be controlled by our concious this will be a real danger to free will

means that we have no control over our actions and we only see the "Pre-Thinked" actions being executed (and of course this changes everything about moral and legal responsibility)

I.E:A husband kills his wife with a pistol

The husband really "decided" to kill his wife? or the unconcious processes in his brain did it and the concious "sense of agency" only adapted itself to believe that he killed his wife?

Im a bit confused about the above articles mean,if we really have decision power or not

I would like to hear opinions from people who know more of this topic

Greetings!!!

[Leia Marie]

"Our brains are simply meat computers that, like real computers, are programmed by our genes and experiences to convert an array of inputs into a predetermined output."

"Memories, for example, are nothing more than structural and chemical changes in your brain cells. "

Dear Dr. Coyne, please resist the lure of reductionism, or foundationalism. This is an assumption about causation that is not actually supported by the practice of science (Woodward 2005).