Suppose we are in a bar and I intend to punch you for insulting my sister. My intention is formed in light of my consideration of the good reasons there are in favor of punching you. Suppose Max, the powerful demon/neurologist able to manipulate my intentions, is monitoring me, but he takes himself to be my guardian angel, ready to replace my intentions with ones based on what he views as good reasons. He is also a little drunk, so he mistakes my intention to punch for an intention to hug. “But this is wrong,” he thinks, “as the insult calls for a punch, not a hug.” He thus eliminates my actual intention to punch (what he thinks is an intention to hug) and replaces it with an exactly similar intention to punch. I then act on it.
Is the implanted intention attributable to me?
To answer, go here.
Would this qualify as a luck reinstatement of a sufficient condition of responsibility? Luck often undercuts attributions of responsibility by undermining necessary conditions; maybe this is a mirror of that in terms of sufficiency, and indicates an asymmetry of source of those conditions with respect to responsibility attributions. I offer this comment hesitantly; perhaps such remarks as mine should be closed off in cases of surveys to prevent contamination of the survey. (A metasuggestion if of any value beyond the comment itself.)
Posted by: V. Alan White | 06/13/2012 at 10:21 PM
Possible intuition pollutants ahead: go vote first before reading (I'm not suggesting that my views are so profound that they will change your mind, but just that it might be worthwhile not to engage to much with arguments before voting. But I'm not sure even about that).
I voted 'no' but I really wasn't sure whether I really believed that. First I think there is a prior question about Max's reliability. I see no reason why Max may not be any more autonomy undermining than a well functioning DLPFC. In fact, he may just *be* a souped up DLPFC. I think, though, for Max to be a souped up DLPFC he needs to pass a certain standard of reliability in acting and in reflecting what really count by my lights as good reasons. And I don't have enough information (which is partially historical information) to make that call.
On the other hand, Max's drunkness might undermine attributability if his drunkness results in a sufficient lowering of his reliability. Again, we need more information: how reliable is he normally and how much does drunkenness interfere? it is this consideration that led me to vote no. But if it doesn't interfere sufficiently (say it only interferes with his perception of my intentions but not his perception of what I actually have good reason - in some appropriate sense of reason - to do), then it might be that we should judge the case the other way.
Posted by: Neil Levy | 06/13/2012 at 10:50 PM
I too voted no, but was troubled by another missing piece of info. What I wanted to know is how Medtronic Max is supposed to go about "replacing my intentions". Knees and heart valves can be replaced, but I am not familiar with any intention-replacement procedures. Is this kind of story supposed to connect with our experience of real agents in the real world, or have we careened off into philo-fantasy-land, where all our intuitions about agency and responsibility likely break down? Don’t we need to hear at least a plausible neuro-scientific story about how Max does what he is supposed to do? The details matter. Suppose Max is controlling a series of intracranial implants. One circuit allows him to interrupt short-term memory, effectively erasing any current attentions. Another circuit overstimulates the amygdala, making the person very agitated and upset. Another…etc. Understanding how we believe Max acts to “replace” my intention, I become much more confident and comfortable in my judgments about agency and responsibility.
Posted by: Philoponus | 06/14/2012 at 12:20 PM
Both your initial "good reasons" and the demon Max's more immediate, implanted reasons are beyond your ultimate control and are not therefore attributable to you. In fact, all of the mitigating factors that are assumedly meant to blur attributably in this case are merely more complicated lines of causation. I am unable to see why someone's intuitions about this case, should be any different from their intuitions about cases with simpler lines of causation. You would also have to say ‘no’ (to his action being attributable to him) to the following case as well: I punch you in the face for fun (a version of the initial case without a good reason, demon Max, or demon Max's blood alcohol level). Ultimately, the only difference between the suggested case and any other case is the higher observed complexity.
Posted by: Brent | 06/14/2012 at 12:30 PM