My colleague Antony Aumann and I are wondering if anyone knows of work on a purported asymmetry in norms regarding holding oneself responsible as opposed to holding others responsible. The Christian tradition often emphasizes it, as we see in famous dicta: "judge not lest ye be judged," "take the log out of your own eye before the splinter out of your brother's," etc. Kant and Kierkegaard also both appear to recommend giving others, but not ourselves, the benefit of the doubt.
From what we understand of Kant and Kierkegaard’s position, their reason for recommending going easy on others is that we can't directly infer others' motivations from their actions and we have an obligation to interpret others in the best possible light. What's puzzling is that both appear to accept that we do not infallibly know our own motivations, either. Yet they recommend that we treat ourselves more harshly and thus risk blaming ourselves when we are not blameworthy.
Suppose someone accepts both that motivations are the proper objects of praise and blame and that our knowledge of our own minds isn't infallible. What resources does such a person have to defend the asymmetry in holding responsible?
We’re interested in any work that discusses the asymmetry, whether or not it accepts that motivations are the proper target of praise and blame.