I've been listening to Sam Harris' FREE WILL on my iPod. One line of argument is a standard constructive dilemma similar to Strawson's basic argument. If determinism is true, we don't have free will; indeterminism can't help, for that is just randomness. Therefore, we don't have free will.
But there is also a second line of argument, based on personal identity or our lack of it. I've only listened to it a few times, so I'm not sure I have the structure down yet. But it goes something like this:
1/ Deep moral responsibility requires a conscious self that is responsible.
2/ Nothing can play that role.
Subargument: Neuroscience shows us that there are causal influences to our behavior of which we are unaware. If we decide to include that as part of the self, then were do we stop? Why not include involuntary behavior, as well?
3/ Therefore, there is no deep moral responsibility.
Anyone know of any work on this kind of argument? Also, it seems similar to Eddy's stuff on bypassing worries as well as a much older argument by John Hospers from "Meaning and Free Will" and other works. Any thoughts about this?