Flickers of Freedom

Clark on Waller's Semi-Compatibilism (in Reverse)

Bruce Waller recently published an interesting new book entitled Against Moral Responsibility (MIT Press).  I am only half way through the book right now myself, but I think thus far Waller has done a nice job of motivating skepticism about desert-entailing moral responsibility.  Fortunately, Tom Clark has written up a great review over at Naturalism.org.  So, check it out here.

At Last, Part II

Another eminently reasonable popular article on free will and neuroscience: A review in the Financial Times of several new books on free will, including Tamler's terrific book. 

 

 

Conversation and Responsibility

Congratulations to Michael McKenna!  His book entitled Conversation and Responsibility (Oxford University Press) is now available for mass consumption.  Don't be the last fool who hasn't read what I can only imagine will be a book that shapes the free will debate in the years ahead.

 

OUP Description:

In this book Michael McKenna advances a new theory of moral responsibility, one that builds upon the work of P.F. Strawson. As McKenna demonstrates, moral responsibility can be explained on analogy with a conversation. The relation between a morally responsible agent and those who hold her morally responsible is similar to the relation between a speaker and her audience. A responsible agent's actions are bearers of meaning -- agent meaning -- just as a speaker's utterances are bearers of speaker meaning. Agent meaning is a function of the morally quality of the will with which the agent acts. Those who hold an agent morally responsible for what she does do so by responding to her as if in a conversation. By responding with certain morally reactive attitudes, such as resentment or indignation, they thereby communicate their regard for the meaning taken to be revealed in that agent's actions. It is then open for the agent held responsible to respond to those holding her responsible by offering an apology, a justification, an excuse, or some other response, thereby extending the evolving conversational exchange. 

The conversational theory of moral responsibility that McKenna develops here accepts two features of Strawson's theory: that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal -- so that being responsible must be understood by reference to the nature of holding responsible -- and that the moral emotions are central to holding responsible. While upholding these two aspects of Strawson's theory, McKenna's theory rejects a further Strawsonian thesis, which is that holding morally responsible is more fundamental or basic than being morally responsible. On the conversational theory, the conditions for holding responsible are dependent on the nature of the agent who is responsible. So holding responsible cannot be more basic than being responsible. Nevertheless, the nature of the agent who is morally responsible is to be understood in terms of sensitivity to those who would make moral demands of her, thereby holding her responsible. Being responsible is therefore also dependent on holding responsible. Thus, neither being nor holding morally responsible is more basic than the other. They are mutually dependent.

Fischer on Deep Control

Congrats to John Martin Fischer for the recent publication of the third in his trilogy of collections with OUP which is entitled Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value (the first two were My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility and Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will). 

Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will

While I haven't had a chance to read it yet, David Hodgson has recently published what looks to be an interesting and important book with OUP entitled Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will.  

Here is the description:

In recent years, philosophical discussions of free will have focused largely on whether or not free will is compatible with determinism. In this challenging book, David Hodgson takes a fresh approach to the question of free will, contending that close consideration of human rationality and human consciousness shows that together they give us free will, in a robust and indeterministic sense. In particular, they give us the capacity to respond appositely to feature-rich gestalts of conscious experiences, in ways that are not wholly determined by laws of nature or computational rules. The author contends that this approach is consistent with what science tells us about the world; and he considers its implications for our responsibility for our own conduct, for the role of retribution in criminal punishment, and for the place of human beings in the wider scheme of things.

 

Perplexed? Maybe you need a new guide!

The second edition of the Oxford Handbook of Free Will is out. Thanks to Bob Kane for putting it together.

Elements of Moral Cognition

John Mikhail's long-awaited book Elements of Moral Cognition is finally available.  The Rawlsian/Chomskyean line of reasoning explored by Mikhail in his previous research on moral grammar is fully fleshed out in this book, so I expect it to have an immediate and lasting impact on the growing field of moral psychology.  

Abstract:

Is the science of moral cognition usefully modeled on aspects of Universal Grammar? Are human beings born with an innate “moral grammar” that causes them to analyze human action in terms of its moral structure, with just as little awareness as they analyze human speech in terms of its grammatical structure? Questions like these have been at the forefront of moral psychology ever since John Mikhail revived them in his infl uential work on the linguistic analogy and its implications for jurisprudence and moral theory. In this seminal book, Mikhail offers a careful and sustained analysis of the moral grammar hypothesis, showing how some of John Rawls’ original ideas about the linguistic analogy, together with famous thought experiments like the trolley problem, can be used to improve our understanding of moral and legal judgment. The book will be of interest to philosophers, cognitive scientists, legal scholars, and other researchers in the interdisciplinary fi eld of moral psychology

Effective Intentions + Free Will and Consciousness

I thought some of you might be interested to know that Al Mele's recent book Effective Intentions is now out in paperback for less than $20.  Relatedly, you might also be interested in the volume Mele co-edited with Roy Baumeister and Kathleen Vohs entitled Free Will and Consciousness:  How Might They Work?  As always, happy reading!

 

The Moral Psychology Handbook

John Doris's The Moral Psychology Handbook (OUP) just came out.  So, you should check it out.  Here is the description:

The Moral Psychology Handbook offers a survey of contemporary moral psychology, integrating evidence and argument from philosophy and the human sciences. The chapters cover major issues in moral psychology, including moral reasoning, character, moral emotion, positive psychology, moral rules, the neural correlates of ethical judgment, and the attribution of moral responsibility. Each chapter is a collaborative effort, written jointly by leading researchers in the field.

As always, happy reading!

Welcome to Flickers of Freedom

Welcome to Flickers of Freedom. We decided to create this blog to fill the vacuum left by the closing of the Garden of Forking Paths.   We aim to promote the discussion of issues in the philosophy of action, concentrating on free will, moral responsibility and agency. We hope to build on the success of the Garden (and avoid the problems that led to its closing).

The Garden of Forking Paths was a success.  It lasted nearly six years and it provided a forum for high quality discussion. Some of its posts led directly to journal publications; many contributed less directly to publications. It also enabled philosophers working in different parts of the United States, and in different parts of the world, to establish friendships and a genuine community.  Many of us played a part in that success.  But we also acknowledge some responsibility for its eventual closing. We took the Garden for granted; we were less active than we should have been.  We only realized how important the forum was for us, personally and professionally, when we were faced with the prospect of losing it. We hope that the experience will jolt all of us out of our lethargy, and that Flickers of Freedom will carry on the best traditions of the Garden.

We believe that our renewed commitment to sustaining a lively agency community will help to avoid the problems that led to the closing of the Garden. Beyond this, we are taking steps to ensure that post quality is high and that postings are frequent. Taking Pea Soup, the ethics blog, as our model, we have decided at least initially to limit the pool of contributors to professionals working in the philosophy or psychology of agency.  We are also setting down a requirement that contributors contribute at least two posts a year to the blog (not including brief pointers to news items or upcoming conferences, papers, etc.). In addition, comments will be moderated. Commenting on the blog will be open to all comers; the only requirement is that comments be (reasonably) polite and on topic.

A word on the name. Flickers of Freedom is a phrase introduced into philosophical debate by John Martin Fischer, in his highly influential discussion of the Frankfurt-style cases that help motivate his semi-compatibilism.  We adopt the name for this blog not because we expect that it will be appropriate to describe it as merely a flicker of freedom, but in tribute to John Martin Fischer. Not only is his work a central reference for all us, but we also want to acknowledge the role he played in establishing and guiding the Garden. He was pivotal to its success, though he cannot be blamed for its eventual closure. We hope the lively, penetrating but always generous philosophical voice of John Fischer will be echoed here at Flickers.

These are exciting times in the philosophy of agency. In the past 12 months, at least half a dozen important books on many different aspects of the topic have been published, as well as dozens of papers in the best journals. There are new developments in the defense of the main positions (libertarianism, compatibilism, and skepticism about free will), in the science of agency, in discussions of moral responsibility, and much more. There has also been the establishment of an exciting new interdisciplinary free will project at Florida State University. We expect Flickers to benefit from, and help to foster this activity. Let’s flicker!

Best wishes,

Thomas Nadelhoffer, Neil Levy, Tamler Sommers, Dan Speak, Eddy Nahmias, Manuel Vargas, Michael McKenna, & Daniel Cohen