Flickers of Freedom

Free Will Debate on Youtube

 Thanks to Bob Doyle for bringing the following series of videos to my attention.  Each one is from a worskshop in Barcelona this past October that was entitled "Is Science Compatible with Our Desire for Freedom?" 

Agency and Responsibility in Scientific American

There are three recent pieces in Scientific American that readers of this blog might find of interest:

1. "How Free Is Your Will?" by Daniela Schiller and David Carmel.
2. "Neuroscience in the Courtroom," by Michael Gazzaniga.
3. "Inside the Mind of a Psychopath," by Kent Kiehl and Joshua Buckholtz.

As always, happy reading!

Baker on van Inwagen's Revised Consequence Argument

WARNING: Logic ahead!

Lot’s of folks have commented on van Inwagen’s “Free Will Remains a Mystery” (2000; Kane 2002) but most of the commentaries are about part 2: the rollback (or Mind or luck) argument against the libertarian agency theory. Almost nothing has been written about part 1, his revised version of the consequence argument. There is one notable replay that goes virtually unnoticed: Lynn Rudder Baker’s “The Irrelevance of the Consequence Argument,” Analysis 68.1 (2008): 13-22.

Recall that van Inwagen’s third argument was under attack because of a counterexample to transfer principle Beta: From Np, N(p --> q) derive Nq. (The counterexample is derived from McKay and Johnson 1996 and others.)

Suppose that a coin was not tossed though I was able to toss the coin. Let:

h = the coin landed heads

f = the coin was tossed (or flipped)

N~h = the coin did not land heads & no one is or ever was able to act so as to ensure that the coin landed heads = TRUE

N(~h --> ~f) = N(if the coin did not land heads, then the coin was not tossed) = TRUE

N(~f) = the coin was not tossed & no one is or ever was able to act so as to ensure that the coin was tossed = FALSE

Why is N(~h --> ~f) true, you might ask?

1. If the coin did not land heads, then the coin was not tossed = TRUE [for the coin was not tossed, so the consequence is true].

2. ~(If the coin did not land heads, then the coin was not tossed) = the coin was tossed and landed heads.

3. No one is or ever was able to act so as to ensure that the coin was tossed and landed heads = TRUE.

There are lots of different ways to fix the third argument in light of this counterexample. Crisp and Warfield (2000) suggest replacing Beta with:

Beta*: From Np, p entails q derive Nq (Widerker 1987).

McKay and Johnson suggested redefining the N-operator and van Inwagen follows this route. Van Inwagen’s definitions here are a bit complicated, so bear with me. First, he rephrases everything in terms of having access to various regions of logical space, where a region of logical space corresponds to a proposition (4-5). Intuitively, one has a choice about whether some true proposition is true provided that one is able to ensure that the proposition is false. (Remember, we’re working with classical free will here: the ability to do otherwise.) This leads to:

“Np” =df. “p and every region of logical space to which anyone has, or ever had, access overlaps p” (7).

Unfortunately, as the above counterexample indicates, this definition is inadequate. Van Inwagen: “I may, for example, be able to ensure that the dart hit the board, but unable to ensure with respect to any proper part of the board that it hit that proper part.” (5) I may also be able to toss a coin but not ensure that it lands heads.

Van Inwagen alters the definition in an attempt to get around this problem: “Np” =df. “p and every region to which anyone has, or ever had, exact access is a subregion of p” (8).

Suppose it would be good if you tossed a coin and it came up heads (think “No Country for Old Men”) but you don’t even toss the coin. Van Inwagen says: “You had a choice about whether the coin was tossed, and if you had tossed it, it might have landed ‘heads.’ What you are to blame for is not doing your best to bring it about that the coin landed ‘heads’.” (8) As McKay and Johnson note, by weakening from would-ability to might-ability, one actually strengthens the transfer principle and given this alteration Beta survives the above counterexample.

What Counts as Evidence for the Meaning of Free Will?

In the comments to Eddy's post on the free will of dogs (which I found troubling since it means that my new dog Charlie on occasion freely chooses to eat the feces of the other dogs), Alan made the following very interesting remark: 

What we mean by [free will] can change, but only by means of evidence, not ad populum fallacy. The thorny thing is agreeing on what matters as evidence, and in some ways the incompatibilism/compatibilism debate seems actually to get in the way of assessing what counts as evidence here.

I asked Alan what he thought should count as evidence for the meaning of free will and he responded in the comments.  Now I'd like to throw out this question to the rest of the Flickerers. (I miss the word "Gardeners").  What counts as evidence for a change in the meaning of free will, and does the incompatibilist/compatibilist debate get in the way of determining it?  If so, how?

(Manuel might have some views on this, I imagine...)

 

Determinism: the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

Compatibilism holds that free will can coexist with determinism. But what exactly is determinism? The term is sometimes used casually and with somewhat fluctuating meanings. Different versions (or aspects) constrain free will theories to quite different degrees.

SOME DEFINITIONS

I was introduced to determinism during one Christmas break, when I read Will Durant’s The Story of Philosophy to get some background before my first college philosophy course. As I recall, Durant said determinism was based on a vision of the universe as a giant machine, cranking along as it inevitably must. The categories of actual and possible overlap 100%, which means that everything that happens is the only possible thing that could happen. My naive undergraduate mind didn’t see much room for free will in that scenario. If anything, getting rid of foofy notions like free will seemed to be precisely the point.

More recently, Al Mele defined determinism in the Encyclopedia of Consciousness as “the thesis that the combination of a complete statement of the laws of nature and a complete description of the condition of the entire universe at any point in time logically entails a complete description of the condition of the entire universe at any other point in time.” Adina Roskies defines it in TICS as belief that “the state of the universe is entirely a function of physical law and the initial conditions of the universe.” The Big Questions in Free Will Lexicon of Key Terms (http://www.freewillandscience.com/wp/?page_id=63) defines it as “The thesis that a complete statement of the laws of nature together with a complete description of the entire universe at any point in time logically entails a complete description of the entire universe at any other point in time.”

Measuring Beliefs about Responsibility and Agency

Background:

Beginning in the early 1980s, a small group of psychologists became especially interested in lay beliefs concerning free will (see, e.g., Stroessner and Green 1990; Viney et al. 1982; 1984; 1988) but by the early 1990s, this interest had waned.  We are now seeing a resurgence of interest among psychologists and experimental philosophers in folk intuitions concerning the relationship between free will, determinism, neuroscience, reductionism, and responsibility. For instance, researchers have recently explored the relationship between lay beliefs in free will and pro-social behavior (see, e.g., Baumeister et al. 2009; Vohs and Schooler 2008).  However, there are serious shortcomings in existing scales.  Most significantly, whereas the philosophical literature on free will makes careful and fine-grained distinctions about the nature of free will, extant scales have failed to be sensitive to these distinctions.  As a result, the scales used thus far have been too blunt to enable researchers to adequately illuminate the contours of folk intuitions concerning free will and cognate beliefs.  To get a sense of the content of some existing scales, check out the following attachment—which contains a summary.

Download Competing Free Will and Responsibility Scales

Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) & Well Being

There is a fascinating four part series entitled Bomb in the Brain that addresses the issues associated with adverse childhood experiences and adult health and psychology problems.

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Thanks to Greg Minton for bringing the videos to my attention.  Good stuff!  If nothing else, I hope to post something soon that ties this literature specifically to the question of free will and responsibility.  For now, I just wanted to pass the links along.  As always, happy viewing...

Clearing the Path

My congratulations  to all concerned on the launch of “Flickers of Freedom”.  I look forward to reading and participating in its discussions.  My only reservation (and the reason I didn’t engage the first discussion)  is that I’m afraid I don’t know what a “Flicker of Freedom” is supposed to be.

I had a similar problem with “The Garden of Forking Paths”.  Both titles seem to me empty metaphors: placeholders for concepts never made clear, promissory notes for arguments that are never delivered.  I would suggest that if we are to make progress in this field we need to hit “reset”  and  try for that clarity that philosophers are supposed to prize.

If determinism were true, we would lack free will.  So say incompatibilists, some of whom quickly add that it wouldn't really matter, since we would still be morally responsible.  But never mind the mattering and moral responsibility part.  I'm interested in the first part: the claim that we would lack free will.  I want to know why. I want to know how.

Welcome to Flickers of Freedom

Welcome to Flickers of Freedom. We decided to create this blog to fill the vacuum left by the closing of the Garden of Forking Paths.   We aim to promote the discussion of issues in the philosophy of action, concentrating on free will, moral responsibility and agency. We hope to build on the success of the Garden (and avoid the problems that led to its closing).

The Garden of Forking Paths was a success.  It lasted nearly six years and it provided a forum for high quality discussion. Some of its posts led directly to journal publications; many contributed less directly to publications. It also enabled philosophers working in different parts of the United States, and in different parts of the world, to establish friendships and a genuine community.  Many of us played a part in that success.  But we also acknowledge some responsibility for its eventual closing. We took the Garden for granted; we were less active than we should have been.  We only realized how important the forum was for us, personally and professionally, when we were faced with the prospect of losing it. We hope that the experience will jolt all of us out of our lethargy, and that Flickers of Freedom will carry on the best traditions of the Garden.

We believe that our renewed commitment to sustaining a lively agency community will help to avoid the problems that led to the closing of the Garden. Beyond this, we are taking steps to ensure that post quality is high and that postings are frequent. Taking Pea Soup, the ethics blog, as our model, we have decided at least initially to limit the pool of contributors to professionals working in the philosophy or psychology of agency.  We are also setting down a requirement that contributors contribute at least two posts a year to the blog (not including brief pointers to news items or upcoming conferences, papers, etc.). In addition, comments will be moderated. Commenting on the blog will be open to all comers; the only requirement is that comments be (reasonably) polite and on topic.

A word on the name. Flickers of Freedom is a phrase introduced into philosophical debate by John Martin Fischer, in his highly influential discussion of the Frankfurt-style cases that help motivate his semi-compatibilism.  We adopt the name for this blog not because we expect that it will be appropriate to describe it as merely a flicker of freedom, but in tribute to John Martin Fischer. Not only is his work a central reference for all us, but we also want to acknowledge the role he played in establishing and guiding the Garden. He was pivotal to its success, though he cannot be blamed for its eventual closure. We hope the lively, penetrating but always generous philosophical voice of John Fischer will be echoed here at Flickers.

These are exciting times in the philosophy of agency. In the past 12 months, at least half a dozen important books on many different aspects of the topic have been published, as well as dozens of papers in the best journals. There are new developments in the defense of the main positions (libertarianism, compatibilism, and skepticism about free will), in the science of agency, in discussions of moral responsibility, and much more. There has also been the establishment of an exciting new interdisciplinary free will project at Florida State University. We expect Flickers to benefit from, and help to foster this activity. Let’s flicker!

Best wishes,

Thomas Nadelhoffer, Neil Levy, Tamler Sommers, Dan Speak, Eddy Nahmias, Manuel Vargas, Michael McKenna, & Daniel Cohen