Minds, Brains, and the Law

The Antisocial Person

The Annals of General Psychiatry has a nice review piece entitled, "The 'antisocial' person: an insight in to biology, classification and current evidence on treatment."

Abstract

Background: This review analyses and summarises the recent advances in understanding the neurobiology of violence and empathy, taxonomical issues on defining personality disorders characterised by disregard for social norms, evidence for efficacy of different treatment modalities and ethical implications in defining 'at-risk' individuals for preventive interventions.

Methods: PubMed was searched with the keywords 'antisocial personality disorder', 'dissocial personality disorder' and 'psychopathy'. The search was limited to articles published in English over the last 10 years (1999 to 2009)

Results: Both diagnostic manuals used in modern psychiatry, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual published by the American Psychiatric Association and the International Classification of Diseases published by the World Health Organization, identify a personality disorder sharing similar traits. It is termed antisocial personality disorder in the diagnostic and statistical manual and dissocial personality disorder in the International Classification of Diseases. However, some authors query the ability of the existing manuals to identify a special category termed 'psychopathy', which in their opinion deserves special attention. On treatment-related issues, many psychological and behavioural therapies have shown success rates ranging from 25% to 62% in different cohorts. Multisystemic therapy and cognitive behaviour therapy have been proven efficacious in many trials. There is no substantial evidence for the efficacy of pharmacological therapy. Currently, the emphasis is on early identification and prevention of antisocial behaviour despite the ethical implications of defining at-risk children.Conclusions: Further research is needed in the areas of neuroendocrinological associations of violent behaviour, taxonomic existence of psychopathy and efficacy of treatment modalities.

MAOA and Criminal Responsibility

Matthew Baum has a new piece in Neuroethics entitled, "The MAOA Predisposition to Impulsive Violence: Is it Relevant to Criminal Trials?"  

Here is the abstract:

In Italy, a judge reduced the sentence of a defendant by 1 year in response to evidence for a genetic predisposition to violence. The best characterized of these genetic differences, those in the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA), were cited as especially relevant. Several months previously in the USA, MAOA data contributed to a jury reducing charges from 1st degree murder (a capital offence) to voluntary manslaughter. Is there a rational basis for this type of use of MAOA evidence in criminal court? This paper will review in context recent work on the MAOA gene–environment interaction in predisposing individuals to violence and address the relevance of such findings to murder trials. Interestingly, the MAOA genetic variants impact future violence and aggression only when combined with the adverse environmental stimuli of childhood maltreatment. Thus nature and nurture interact to determine the individual’s risk. Based on current evidence, I argue there is a weak case for mitigation. But should future experiments confirm the hypothesis that individual differences in impulse control and response to provocation found in MAOA-L men (without abuse) are significantly magnified when combined with childhood maltreatment, the case could turn into a stronger one.

 

Malintent Detection and the Spectre of Pre-Crime

Nature News has a recent piece on developing technologies for detecting "malintent."  Here is an excerpt:

"Planning a sojourn in the northeastern United States? You could soon be taking part in a novel security programme that can supposedly 'sense' whether you are planning to commit a crime.

Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST), a US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) programme designed to spot people who are intending to commit a terrorist act, has in the past few months completed its first round of field tests at an undisclosed location in the northeast, Nature has learned.

Like a lie detector, FAST measures a variety of physiological indicators, ranging from heart rate to the steadiness of a person's gaze, to judge a subject's state of mind. But there are major differences from the polygraph. FAST relies on non-contact sensors, so it can measure indicators as someone walks through a corridor at an airport, and it does not depend on active questioning of the subject.

The tactic has drawn comparisons with the science-fiction concept of 'pre-crime', popularized by the film Minority Report, in which security services can detect someone's intention to commit a crime. Unlike the system in the film, FAST does not rely on a trio of human mutants who can see the future. But the programme has attracted copious criticism from researchers who question the science behind it."

Check out the original article for the rest of the story!

 

Neuroscientific Challenges to Retributivism

Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson have a new piece entitled, "Neuroscientific Challenges to Retributivism" that is scheduled to appear in a forthcoming volume that I am editing for Oxford University Press entitled The Future of Punishment.

Abstract:      
We examine two recent challenges to retribution-based justifications for criminal punishment based on neuroscientific evidence. The first seeks to undermine retributivism because of the brain activity of subjects engaged in punishment decisions for retributive (as opposed to consequentialist) reasons. This challenge proceeds by linking retributivism with deontological moral theories and the brain activity correlated with deontological moral judgments. The second challenge seeks to undermine retributivism by exposing, through neuroscientific information, the purportedly implausible foundation on which retributivism depends: one based on free will and folk psychology. 

We conclude that neither challenge succeeds. The first challenge fails, in part, because the brain activity of punishers does not provide the appropriate criteria for whether judgments regarding criminal punishment are justified or correct. Moreover, retributivism does not necessarily depend on the success or failure of any particular moral theory. The second challenge fails because neuroscience does not undermine the conceptions of free will or folk psychology on which retributivism depends. Along the way, we point out a number of faulty inferences and problematic assumptions and presuppositions involved in these challenges to retributivism.

The Deciding Brain

Charlie Rose recently hosted a series of discussions about recent advances in the sciences of the mind. One of these shows featured LANP's own Joshua Greene.  The episide is entitled, "The Deciding Brain." 

Dennett on Neuroscience, Free Will, and Just Deserts

The Situationist just posted a recent talk that was given at HLS by Dan Dennett entitled "Free Will, Responsibility, and the Brain."  Dennett always gives good talks and this is no exception. So, it's well worth the watch!  

Neuroprediction, Violence, and the Law

I have a forthcoming paper with Stephanos Bibas, Scott Grafton, Kent Kiehl, Andrew Mansfield, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and Michael Gazzaniga entitled "Neuroprediction, Violence, and the Law: Setting the Stage," that is available as an "on-line first" draft on Neuroethics. 

Here is the abstract:

In this paper, our goal is to (a) survey some of the legal contexts within which violence risk assessment already plays a prominent role, (b) explore whether developments in neuroscience could potentially be used to improve our ability to predict violence, and (c) discuss whether neuropredictive models of violence create any unique legal or moral problems above and beyond the well worn problems already associated with prediction more generally. In “Violence Risk Assessment and the Law”, we briefly examine the role currently played by predictions of violence in three high stakes legal contexts: capital sentencing (“Violence Risk Assessment and Capital Sentencing”), civil commitment hearings (“Violence Risk Assessment and Civil Commitment”), and “sexual predator” statutes (“Violence Risk Assessment and Sexual Predator Statutes”). In “Clinical vs. Actuarial Violence Risk Assessment”, we briefly examine the distinction between traditional clinical methods of predicting violence and more recently developed actuarial methods, exemplified by the Classification of Violence Risk (COVR) software created by John Monahan and colleagues as part of the MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and Violence [1]. In “The Neural Correlates of Psychopathy”, we explore what neuroscience currently tells us about the neural correlates of violence, using the recent neuroscientific research on psychopathy as our focus. We also discuss some recent advances in both data collection (“Cutting-Edge Data Collection: Genetically Informed Neuroimaging”) and data analysis (“Cutting-Edge Data Analysis: Pattern Classification”) that we believe will play an important role when it comes to future neuroscientific research on violence. In “The Potential Promise of Neuroprediction”, we discuss whether neuroscience could potentially be used to improve our ability to predict future violence. Finally, in “The Potential Perils of Neuroprediction”, we explore some potential evidentiary (“Evidentiary Issues”), constitutional (“Constitutional Issues”), and moral (“Moral Issues”) issues that may arise in the context of the neuroprediction of violence.

 

Neuroscience, Neurolaw?

Here is an interesting and engaging recent round table discussion from Canadian TV that includes LANP's own Joshua Greene:

 

 

How Neuroscience is Changing the Law

Big Think has a recent piece that incorporates an interview with our own Owen Jones entitled, "How Neuroscience is Changing the Law."

Software, Prediction, and Future Violence

ABC News recently posted a piece entitled "Software Predicts Criminal Behavior" which examines the software that has been developed by Richard Berk and colleagues for the purposes of violence risk assessment.  Legal decision makers in Washington D.C. are going to be using the software to make determinations concerning sentencing and bail.